McFarland v. Liberty Insurance Corporation Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 45781 by unknown
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
RYAN MCFARLAND and KATHRYN 
MCFARLAND, 
Plaintiffs - Appellants, 
vs. 



















APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada 
________________ 
 
The Honorable Lynn Norton, District Judge, Presiding 
Ryan T. McFarland 
MCFARLAND RITTER PLLC 
P.O. Box 1335 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Attorneys for Appellants Ryan 
McFarland and Kathryn McFarland 
Robert A. Anderson 
Robby J. Perucca 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 





Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
- i - 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 
II. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................. 2 
A. The McFarlands Showed that the District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment in 
Favor of Liberty. ......................................................................................................................... 2 
B. Liberty’s Arguments Do Not Support Affirming the District Court’s Decision. ................ 6 
i. Because Liberty Failed to Define “Dwelling” in the Policy, The Court Should Apply the 
Ordinary Meaning of the Term. ............................................................................................... 6 
ii. The McFarlands Negotiated “Dwelling” Coverage for the Garage and Bonus Room. ... 7 
iii. Ambiguous Language Must be Construed in Favor of Coverage. ................................... 8 
iv. Liberty has not Distinguished Arreguin. ........................................................................ 10 
v. “Dwelling” is Ambiguous Because it Has No Settled Legal Meaning. ......................... 11 
vi. The Word “One” in “One Family Dwelling” Modifies the Word “Family,” not 
“Dwelling.” ............................................................................................................................ 17 
C. Liberty Is Not Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees or Costs. ......................................................... 18 




- ii - 
 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Bare v. Com., 122 Va. 783, 94 S.E. 168 (1917) ..................................................................... 14, 16 
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662–63, 115 P.3d 751, 
753–54 (2005) ............................................................................................................................. 7 
City of Boise v. Planet Ins. Co., 126 Idaho 51, 57, 878 P.2d 750, 756 (1994) ............................... 9 
Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2003) ............ 7 
Course v. State, 469 So. 2d 80, 81 (Miss. 1985)..................................................................... 16, 17 
Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 779, 69 P.3d 1035, 1040 (2003) ...................... 4 
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 110, 350 P.2d 211, 214 (1960) ............................... 4 
Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 223, 220 P.3d 575, 579 (2009) .............................................. 4 
Lupis v. Peoples Mortg. Co., 107 Idaho 489, 492, 690 P.2d 944, 947 (Ct. App. 1984) ................. 4 
Melichar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 143 Idaho 716, 152 P.3d 587 (2007) .......................... 11 
Moss v. Mic-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 300, 647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982) 3, 5, 
6, 11 
Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235, 912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996) ................ 7 
N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Tye, 1 Ga. App. 380, 58 S.E. 110, 111–12 (1907) ............... 13 
State v. Kelly, 2000 WL 1340285, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2000) ................................. 17 
Swanson v. Beco Const. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748, 752 (2007) .................................... 7 
United Carbon Co. v. Conn, 351 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Ky. 1961) .................................................... 16 
Workman v. Ins. Co., 2 La. 507, 508–10 (1831) ........................................................................... 14 
 
- 1 - 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants Ryan McFarland and Kathryn McFarland (“Mr. and Mrs. 
McFarland” or “the McFarlands”), by and through their attorneys of record, McFarland Ritter 
PLLC, respectfully file this Reply Brief in support of their appeal of the District Court’s 
February 8, 2018 Final Judgment in favor of Defendant-Respondent Liberty Insurance 
Corporation (“Liberty”).  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Liberty has failed to provide this Court any reason to find that the word “Dwelling” – 
perhaps the most important word in the entire Policy at issue – should be read to exclude 
coverage of the McFarlands’ Claim. Liberty had the obligation of limiting the word to a single 
structure by so defining it in the Policy; Liberty failed to meet that obligation, and so did not 
have the luxury of limiting it after a Claim was made. Instead, Liberty is stuck with the ordinary 
meaning: “Dwelling” coverage should be applied to the Garage and Bonus Room because the 
McFarlands dwell there, as the McFarlands advised Liberty before the Policy was issued, and as 
the settled legal definition of “Dwelling” requires. In the alternative, if “Dwelling” has no 
accepted, ordinary meaning, then the policy is ambiguous and, by law, the Policy should be 
construed in favor of coverage of the McFarlands’ Claim. Under either scenario, the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Liberty denying the McFarlands 
“Dwelling” coverage.  
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. The McFarlands Showed that the District Court Erred in Granting Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Liberty. 
The McFarlands established the District Court’s error by setting forth the following facts 
(in summary), none of which Liberty has ever disputed:  
1. The dwelling on the Cabin property consists of a main house with a kitchen, 
bathroom, and bedroom, and, just steps away, a detached Garage with the Bonus Room above it. 
R., pp. 125-26.  
2. In or about September 2010, Mrs. McFarland contacted Liberty via telephone to 
inquire about purchasing a homeowner’s insurance policy for the Property. R., p. 122. Mrs. 
McFarland described the Cabin property to the Liberty’s representative, and explained that the 
dwelling includes a kitchen, bath and a bedroom, as well as the detached Garage and Bonus 
Room. R., p. 122-23. 
3. Until the water event giving rise to the Claim, both the Garage and Bonus Room 
were heated and had lighting for continuous, protracted use as part of the dwelling; the Bonus 
Room was furnished with a bed and couch, and the Garage was furnished with other 
accoutrements of daily living. R., pp. 123, 126. 
4. The version of the Policy in effect at the time of the Claim insured the “Dwelling” 
up to a limit of $221,600.00 (“Coverage A”), and “Other Structures” up to $22,160.00 
(“Coverage B”). R., pp. 126, 177. 
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5. The Policy does not define “Dwelling”; instead, the Policy merely refers to the 
word in the negative, by distinguishing it from “Other Structures,” which are non-dwelling 
structures on the property: “We cover other structures on the ‘residence premises’ set apart from 
the dwelling by clear space.” R., p. 139. 
6. In February 15, 2017, the radiant heater in the Bonus Room failed, resulting in hot 
water pouring, unabated for days, onto the floor and walls of the Bonus Room, streaming onto 
the ceiling of the Garage below, and destroying the insulation, drywall, doors, overhead Garage 
doors, and plumbing and electrical components of the Garage and Bonus Room. R., pp. 126-127. 
7. Liberty immediately admitted that the Claim was covered under the Policy. R., p. 
127. 
8. Mr. McFarland and the water remediation company consulted with, and obtained 
the approval of, Liberty, before commencing remediation work. Id. 
9. Liberty issued partial payment to and on behalf of the McFarlands, but the amount 
was insufficient to pay for all of the remediation and repair. R., pp. 127, 129. 
10. Liberty took the position that the applicable coverage limit for the structural 
damage under the Claim was the lower Coverage B limit. R., p. 128. 
Based on these facts, the McFarlands showed in their opening Brief on appeal that the 
District Court erred in determining that the Coverage B limits applied to the Claim:  
- The “burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to 
restrict the scope of its coverage.” Moss v. Mic-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 
300, 647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982).  
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- In determining the meaning of a contract, a court cannot “rewrite [the] contract[]” 
(Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 223, 220 P.3d 575, 579 (2009)), “revise the contract” (Elliott 
v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 779, 69 P.3d 1035, 1040 (2003)), “modify the express 
terms” (Lupis v. Peoples Mortg. Co., 107 Idaho 489, 492, 690 P.2d 944, 947 (Ct. App. 1984)), or 
“make for the parties better agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, and by 
a process of interpretation relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily 
consented to nor can courts interpret an agreement to mean something the contract does not itself 
contain” (J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 110, 350 P.2d 211, 214 (1960)). 
- Because “Dwelling” is not defined in the Policy, the Court must look to the plain, 
ordinary meaning of the term. See Kinsey, 234 P.3d 739, 743 (2010). The District Court cited 
Merriam-Webster and Google, which define “dwelling” as “‘shelter (such as a house) in which 
people live’; ‘a house, apartment, or other place of residence’; and ‘a place where people live.’ 
Thus, the term dwelling is synonymous with house.” R., p. 271. The District Court concluded 
from that definition that the Garage and Bonus Room could not be part of the dwelling because 
the term “Dwelling” must refer to “a singular structure . . . a singular dwelling.” R., p. 271. The 
error in this reasoning is that the word “singular” simply does not appear anywhere in the Policy, 
or in the dictionary definition; neither do the terms “singular structure” or “singular dwelling.” 
By inserting those words, the District Court impermissibly “modif[ied] the express terms” of the 
Policy (Lupis, 690 P.2d at 947), and interpreted the Policy “to mean something the contract does 
not itself contain.” (J.R. Simplot Co., 350 P.2d at 214). 
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- Nothing in Liberty’s Policy prohibits the Dwelling from including more than one 
structure; if Liberty wanted to exclude the Garage and Bonus Room from the “Dwelling,” it was 
incumbent upon Liberty to do so in clear language in the Policy. Moss, 647 P.2d 754, 756 
(1982). 
- The McFarlands expressly purchased, and Liberty expressly sold, insurance to 
cover the Garage and Bonus Room as part of the “Dwelling.” R., p. 122-23. 
- Alternatively, the term “Dwelling” may be ambiguous, which the Court should 
find if the Policy “is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations.” Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co. of Idaho v. Schrock, 150 Idaho 817, 821, 252 P.3d 98, 102 (2011). As this Court has noted, 
 [b]ecause insurance policies are contracts of adhesion that are not 
usually subject to negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity 
in a policy is construed strongly against the insurer. To this 
end, where language may be given two meanings, one of which 
permits recovery while the other does not, the policy should be 
given the construction most favorable to the insured. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted).  
- Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 180 P.3d 498 (2008), 
which the District Court did not address, is an almost perfect analog to this instant case, and this 
Court’s conclusion there is directly applicable here:  
We are compelled to strictly construe the exclusionary provision in 
favor of the insured and the insurance company bears the burden to 
use clear and precise language when restricting the scope of 
coverage. It is unclear whether “outbuildings” covers the buildings 
defined in separate structures or the attached structures defined 
under dwelling. Unlike the other clear and detailed exclusionary 
provisions, the “Outbuildings” provision fails to reference any 
other part of the contract. Therefore, because Farmers has not met 
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its burden to use clear and precise language in this particular 
exclusionary provision, we hold the “Outbuildings” exclusionary 
provision is ambiguous and reverse the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment to Farmers.  
 
Id., 180 P.3d at 502.  
B. Liberty’s Arguments Do Not Support Affirming the District Court’s Decision. 
Liberty has not provided this Court any basis for sustaining the District Court’s decision. 
The McFarlands respond to Liberty’s Respondent’s Brief arguments as follows: 
i. Because Liberty Failed to Define “Dwelling” in the Policy, The Court Should 
Apply the Ordinary Meaning of the Term. 
First, Liberty argues that allowing “Dwelling” to be dependent upon an insured’s use or 
subjective belief nullifies the purpose of Coverage B, and requires circular reasoning. 
Respondent’s Brief, at 6. This argument illustrates why Liberty, the insurer, has the burden of 
using “clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage.” Moss, 647 
P.2d at 756. Without such clear and precise language, the District Court found that the term 
“Dwelling” means “‘a place where people live.’” R., p. 271. This definition does in fact leave the 
meaning of “Dwelling” to how the insured uses the property. Here, the McFarlands used the 
Garage and Bonus Room as part of the dwelling, and, what is more, they told Liberty before 
buying insurance of that use. If that makes the meaning of the Policy dependent on the 
McFarlands’ subject belief – or, more properly, the McFarlands’ use – that is because Liberty 
failed to use clear and precise language to restrict the scope of its coverage.  
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Because Liberty failed to use clear and precise language to exclude the Garage and Bonus 
Room from “Dwelling” coverage, this Court should give effect to the plain meaning of the words 
of the Policy (see Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662–
63, 115 P.3d 751, 753–54 (2005); Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 
66 P.3d 242, 245 (2003); and Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235, 912 
P.2d 119, 122 (1996)), looking at the Policy as a whole (Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 
Idaho 434, 437, 18 P.3d 956, 959 (2000)). Liberty agrees with the law, but urges the Court to 
find that “Dwelling” applies to only a single structure, and is not dependent on the McFarlands’ 
use of the property. The problem with Liberty’s position is that the “single-structure” limitation 
is not found anywhere in the language of the Policy, and by asking the Court to impose that 
limitation Liberty is violating the case law it purportedly relies on: Liberty wants the Court to 
give effect to Liberty’s “subjective, undisclosed interpretation of a word or phrase.” Swanson v. 
Beco Const. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748, 752 (2007). The Court should apply the plain 
meaning of “Dwelling” and find that all portions of the Cabin property where the McFarlands 
“dwell” are subject to the “Dwelling” coverage limits of the Policy. On the McFarlands’ 
property, that includes the main house, as well as the Garage and Bonus Room, as the 
McFarlands specifically advised Liberty prior to when the Policy was issued. 
ii. The McFarlands Negotiated “Dwelling” Coverage for the Garage and Bonus 
Room. 
Next, Liberty argues the argument that the McFarlands specifically advised Liberty, 
prior to buying insurance, that the Garage and Bonus Room were part of the dwelling, is not 
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supported by record. Respondent’s Brief at 8. That argument is wrong on its face: Plaintiff 
Kathryn McFarland testified that she advised Liberty, at the time she applied for insurance, that 
the Cabin “includes a kitchen, bath, and a bedroom, and that a bonus room is located above a 
detached garage. I explained to [Liberty] that the bonus room and garage are regularly and 
continuously used by my family.” R. at 122-23. At no point has Liberty challenged the truth of 
that statement; conversely, Liberty expressly conceded it in Liberty’s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment when Liberty stated, “The material facts 
in this matter are basically undisputed.” R., 245.  
Liberty concludes that the McFarlands were simply underinsured on the Garage and 
Bonus Room, and should have purchased additional coverage. See Respondent’s Brief, at 9. That 
argument is circular: it works only if this Court first accepts Liberty’s position that the dwelling 
does not include the Garage and Bonus Room. The McFarlands never knew or could have known 
that they were potentially “underinsured” until the loss, the resulting Claim, and Liberty’s 
subsequent denial of “Dwelling” coverage on the Garage and Bonus Room.  
iii. Ambiguous Language Must be Construed in Favor of Coverage.  
Next, Liberty argues that a policy provision is construed strictly in favor of the insured 
only where an exclusion is concerned. Respondent’s Brief, at 10. This argument is contrary to 
law, as articulated by this Court:  
This Court exercises free review over questions of law, including 
whether an insurance policy is ambiguous. If the language of an 
insurance policy is clear, then the language will be given its plain 
and ordinary meaning. To determine whether a policy is 
ambiguous, the Court must ask whether the policy is reasonably 
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subject to conflicting interpretations. If confronted with ambiguous 
language, the reviewing court must determine what a reasonable 
person would understand the language to mean. Furthermore, 
because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion that are not 
usually subject to negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity in 
a policy is construed strongly against the insurer. To this end, 
where language may be given two meanings, one of which permits 
recovery while the other does not, the policy should be given the 
construction most favorable to the insured. 
Schrock, 252 P.3d at 102 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). 
Other cases, including one cited by Liberty, support the principle that ambiguity anywhere in the 
Policy, are to be interpreted in favor of coverage. In City of Boise v. Planet Ins. Co., 126 Idaho 
51, 57, 878 P.2d 750, 756 (1994), the Court found an ambiguity in the definitions sections, not in 
an exclusion, and held: “Because of the ambiguity in the meaning of occurrence, we construe 
the definition most strongly against the company.” Id. at 878 P.2d 750 (emphasis in original). 
The Court thus construes any ambiguity in a Policy in favor of coverage, not just ambiguity in 
exclusions.  
Liberty’s argument is not only wrong legally, but amounts to sophistry. The reason this 
lawsuit exists is because Liberty has excluded coverage of a portion of the McFarlands’ Claim 
using the Policy’s “Dwelling” and “Other Structures” language. Liberty does not exclude 
coverage entirely – it paid the limits applicable to “Other Structures” – but it excluded coverage 
for the amount in excess of the “Other Structures” limit that would be (and, to the McFarlands’ 
point, should be) covered by the “Dwelling” Policy limits. Thus, even if the Court were willing 
to entertain Liberty’s argument, it still fails because at bottom the Court is being asked to 
determine the degree, or amount, of exclusion.  
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iv. Liberty has not Distinguished Arreguin.  
Liberty next attempts, unsuccessfully, to distinguish Arreguin. First, Liberty argues that 
Arreguin is inapplicable because the ambiguous term there was “outbuildings,” not “dwelling” or 
“separate structures.” Respondent’s Brief, at 9. That argument is unavailing because everything 
said about the undefined word “outbuildings” in Arreguin could be said about the undefined 
word “Dwelling” here, with the same legal outcome: 
[T]he insurance company bears the burden to use clear and precise 
language when restricting the scope of coverage. It is unclear 
whether “outbuildings” covers the buildings defined in separate 
structures or the attached structures defined under dwelling. Unlike 
the other clear and detailed exclusionary provisions, the 
“Outbuildings” provision fails to reference any other part of the 
contract. Therefore, because Farmers has not met its burden to use 
clear and precise language in this particular exclusionary 
provision, we hold the “Outbuildings” exclusionary provision is 
ambiguous and reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to Farmers. 
Arreguin, 180 P.3d at 502. Similarly here: it is unclear from the Policy whether “Dwelling” is 
limited to one structure, or also includes the Garage and Bonus Room, where the McFarlands 
expressly advised Liberty that dwelling activity occurs.  
Second, Liberty argues that Arreguin is inapplicable because it dealt with an exclusion. 
As set forth above, the “exclusion” argument is a distinction without a difference: to the extent 
Liberty wishes to deny coverage for the amounts above the “Other Structures” limit, that denial 
constitutes an exclusion of coverage, and therefore the rules for interpreting exclusions apply in 
this case.  
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v. “Dwelling” is Ambiguous Because it Has No Settled Legal Meaning. 
Liberty cites to Melichar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 143 Idaho 716, 152 P.3d 587 
(2007) for the proposition that an undefined word does not make an insurance policy ambiguous 
(see Reply Brief at 10); however, Liberty has failed to give the Court the full quote, which is: 
“the mere fact that a term is undefined in a policy does not make that term ambiguous if it has a 
settled legal meaning. Id., at 152 P.3d 592 (emphasis added). That qualifier, “if it has a settled 
legal meaning” – which Liberty conveniently omits – was the point in Melichar and is the point 
here. In Melichar, this Court found no ambiguity because the meaning of the word “occurrence” 
(the word at issue there) “is well settled in Idaho” (Id.); the same cannot be said for the word 
“Dwelling,” here. Liberty has not provided a “settled legal meaning” of “Dwelling,” and the 
District Court did not cite to one either. Thus, “Dwelling” is ambiguous and should be 
interpreted in favor of coverage. 
In a related attack, Liberty attempts to fault the McFarlands for citing to no authority that 
Dwelling should be interpreted to include multiple structures. Reply Brief, at 7. This argument is 
a head-fake: Liberty bears the burden of using clear and precise language to limit coverage 
(Moss, 647 P.2d at 756); it is not the McFarlands’ burden to prove the negative, i.e., that 
“Dwelling” has no settled legal meaning. In response to a charge that it has failed to meet its 
burden, Liberty should have shown a settled legal meaning. Liberty has utterly failed to provide 
the Court any citation to a case in which the meaning of “Dwelling” was settled, or limited to a 
single structure. The fact that Liberty cannot show a settled legal meaning suggests that none 
exists, and therefore, that the Policy is ambiguous.  
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 The foregoing notwithstanding, there is at least one century-old case, and one nearly two-
centuries-old case, that did wrestle with this issue. Those ancient cases, despite the passage of 
time, are directly applicable here in two respects: (i) they acknowledge that the term “dwelling 
house” or “house” could include a “cluster of buildings,” and (ii) both cases turn on whether the 
insured used clear and precise language in the policy to delineate what was covered (and not 
covered) – what Liberty should have done, but failed to do, here. A Georgia Court found as 
follows in 1907: 
And Mr. Bishop defines a “dwelling house” as “a permanent 
building or cluster of buildings in which a man with his family 
resides. He need not so construct his habitation that all the shelter 
he requires will be under one roof. Therefore the words ‘dwelling 
house’ embrace in law the entire congregation of building, main 
and auxiliary, used for abode.” And upon the same line the words 
“dwelling house” will be found to be defined by numerous other 
law–writers. . . . But we think the decision of this case does not 
depend upon the definition of the word “dwelling house,” because 
the building insured is not only said to be a “dwelling,” but it is 
further described and identified by the words “her two–story 
frame, shingle–roof building and additions thereto,” in one policy, 
and “the two–story shingle–roof frame building and its additions 
adjoining and communicating,” in the other policy. So that the real 
question is, not whether a cluster of disconnected houses may or 
may not in some instances constitute a “dwelling house” (to which 
proposition we fully agree), but whether it can be fairly understood 
as a part of the contract of insurance that “a two–story frame 
building and its additions,” used as a dwelling house, shall also 
include a servant's house feet away, so as to render the insurer 
liable for damage by fire to the servant's house, though there was 
no fire or damage to the two–story frame building.  
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N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Tye, 1 Ga. App. 380, 58 S.E. 110, 111–12 (1907). This 111-
year-old case gives Liberty a perfect template for crafting its policies to unambiguously limit 
“Dwelling” coverage to a single structure. Liberty’s failure to do that should lead this Court to, 
as did the Georgia Court “fully agree” that a “dwelling house” can include “a cluster of 
disconnected houses.” Id.  
 In a 19th Century Louisiana case, a court also found that a “house” includes disconnected 
smaller houses, kitchens, and privies. The problem for the insurer there is the problem for 
Liberty here: the insurer failed to clearly define the property insured.  
The only difficulty which occurs in the decision of this case, arises 
out of the description of the property insured, being too general 
and indefinite to give that clearness and certainty, which it is 
desirable should prevail in all contracts. The property on which the 
insurance was effected is described to be “two houses. . . .” 
 
The evidence of the case shews that the main houses, or building 
insured, are situated in the place designated in the description as 
contained in the body of the policy; that they are used as counting 
and store-houses; that the whole lot on which they are placed, is 
enclosed by the outer walls of these houses and a continuation of 
said walls to the extreme rear of the lot, where two other smaller 
houses are built, for the purpose of storing merchandise, leaving a 
small yard between the front and rear buildings, on the ends of 
which are kitchens and privies, for the use of the occupants of the 
counting-houses. On the 31st of March, 1830, the two houses in 
the rear were entirely destroyed by fire, as well as the kitchens and 
privies, and a slight injury done to the main buildings. . . .  
 
In the construction of every instrument, the ordinary and legal 
meaning of words must be taken into consideration. In the present 
case we must inquire what the parties to the contract meant by the 
word house. In the common and ordinary acceptation, every thing 
appurtenant and accessary to a main building would be embraced 
by this word . . .  
- 14 - 
 
 
We have no doubt of the intention of the insured, in the present 
instance, to secure an indemnity by the contract of insurance, on all 
and every part of his buildings on the lot in the street where they 
are described as situated; this evidently appears from the payment 
(annually) of a premium commensurate with the entire value of the 
whole: 
 
Workman v. Ins. Co., 2 La. 507, 508–10 (1831). 187 years ago, the Louisiana court dealt with the 
same problem presented in this instant case, and looking at both the insufficient description in 
the policy and the intent of the insured, found that the series of disconnected buildings – all of 
which collectively constituted a dwelling – were covered as the insured “house.” This Court 
should decide this case the same way.  
 There is wide recognition in most, if not all, states of the Country, that in non-insurance 
contexts “dwelling” includes adjacent structures connected by common use; in fact, this 
interpretation of “dwelling” is so common and well settled that it is hard to find a recent decision 
on it. What follows is a small sample of the voluminous case law on this question: 
• In Bare v. Com., 122 Va. 783, 94 S.E. 168 (1917), the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals reviewed the ample record already in existence:  
As construed by the courts from the earliest to the latest times, the 
words “dwelling” or “dwelling house” have been construed to 
include not only the main house, but all of the cluster of buildings 
convenient for the occupants of the premises, generally described 
as “within the curtilage.” 
Sir Mathew Hale says:  
“‘Domus mansionalis’ doth not only include the dwelling 
house but also the outhouses that are parcel thereof * * * if they are 
parcel of the messuage, though they are not under the same roof, or 
joining contiguous to it.” Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 558. 
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Blackstone (4 Bl. m. p. 225) announces the same doctrine, saying 
that if the houses are within the common fence, though not under 
the same roof or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein, 
“for the capital house protects and privileges all its branches and 
appurtenances, if within the curtilage or homestall.” 
In 3 Greenleaf (2d Ed.) § 80, we find this succinct and 
comprehensive statement: 
“The term ‘mansion,’ or ‘dwelling house,’ comprehends all 
the outbuildings which are parcel thereof, though they be not 
contiguous to it. All buildings within the same curtilage or 
common fence, and used by the same family, are considered by the 
law as parcel of the mansion. If they are separated from the 
dwelling house, and are not within the same common fence, 
though occupied by the same owner, the question whether they are 
parcel of the mansion or not is a question for the jury upon the 
evidence.” 
Mr. Bishop says: 
“A dwelling house need not be under one roof. It may be a 
cluster of separate buildings and it includes the outhouses and 
buildings in the cluster appurtenant and auxiliary being parcel of 
the messuage and within the curtilage and which are subservient to 
the main dwelling for the purpose of habitation.” 2 Bish. Cr. Law 
(7th Ed.) § 104. State v. Wilson, 2 N. C. 242; Pitcher v. People, 16 
Mich. 147. 
Pendleton, P., in Commonwealth v. Posey, 4 Call (8 Va.) 122, 2 
Am. Dec. 560, says: 
“‘Dwelling house’ is a complex term, and scarcely more 
certain than house; for it is not confined to any particular room in 
the building, nor even to the same room, but it extends to all the 
houses belonging to the curtilage.” 
In Page v. Commonwealth, 26 Grat. (67 Va.) 947, Moncure, P., 
says: 
“An outhouse, adjoining a dwelling house, or under the 
same roof, or within the curtilage thereof and occupied therewith, 
was considered, at common law, as part and parcel of the dwelling 
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house, within the meaning of the law concerning arson and 
burglary.” 
In England the curtilage seems to have included only the buildings 
within the inner fence or yard, because there, in early times, for 
defense, the custom was to inclose such place with a substantial 
wall. In this country, however, such walls or fences, in many cases, 
do not exist, so that with us the curtilage includes the cluster of 
buildings constituting the habitation or dwelling place, whether 
inclosed with an inner fence or not. In Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 
150, it was held, in a case in which the prisoner was charged with 
murder, that a building 36 feet distant from the prisoner's house, 
used for preserving the nets employed in the owner's ordinary 
occupation as a fisherman, and also as a dormitory for his servants, 
is in law a part of his dwelling, though not included with the house 
by a fence, and that a fence is not necessary to include buildings 
within the curtilage if within a space no larger than that usually 
occupied for the purposes of the dwelling and customary 
outbuildings 
Id. 94 S.E. 168, 171–72. 
• Cases in subsequent decades are in accord. “It is traditional to the common law 
that a ‘dwelling’ or ‘dwelling house’ includes the cluster of buildings in which a man with his 
family resides and extends to such outbuildings as are within the curtilage.” United Carbon Co. 
v. Conn, 351 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Ky. 1961). 
• The Mississippi Supreme Court, citing American Jurisprudence, found that “A 
dwelling house has been variously defined as the apartment, room in a hotel, building or cluster 
of buildings in which a man with his family resides, or any permanent building in which a man 
may dwell and lie. Course v. State, 469 So. 2d 80, 81 (Miss. 1985) (emphasis in original).  
• Most recently, the Superior Court of Connecticut observed: 
The words dwelling or dwelling house have been construed to 
include, not only the main house, but all of the cluster of buildings 
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convenient for the occupants of the premises, generally described 
as within the curtilage. Depending upon where the garage is 
situated, it may be deemed as located within the cluster of 
buildings considered within the curtilage.  
State v. Kelly, 2000 WL 1340285, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2000).1 
 
What these cases show is that “dwelling” does in fact have a settled legal meaning: “A 
dwelling house [is] defined as the . . . cluster of buildings in which a man with his family 
resides.” Course v. State, 469 So. 2d at 81. Liberty’s failure to define the word in the Policy 
differently means that “Dwelling” should include the Garage and Bonus Room, as supported by 
law and by the use the McFarlands advised Liberty of long ago. 
vi. The Word “One” in “One Family Dwelling” Modifies the Word “Family,” 
not “Dwelling.” 
Finally, Liberty attempts to persuade the Court that the “one family dwelling” language 
of the Policy requires a finding that “Dwelling” covers only one structure (see Respondent’s 
Brief, at 10). That argument is spurious: the word “one” modifies the word “family,” not 
“dwelling” – that is, “one” indicates the number of families, not the number of structures or 
dwellings, as is clear from the definition of “Residence premises” in the Policy: a “one family 
dwelling . . . or . . . “‘Residence Premises’ also means a two family dwelling.” R., p. 138.  
                                                 
1 The Connecticut Court found that the garage was not part of the dwelling in that case because “no evidence has 
been presented to prove that the garage is associated with the privacies of life.” Id. That is, there was no evidence 
that people “dwelt” there. That is contrary to the undisputed facts in this case, which include (i) the McFarlands 
informed Liberty prior to purchasing the Policy that the Garage and Bonus Room were part of the dwelling, and 
(ii) the McFarlands did in fact “dwell” in the Garage and Bonus Room – that is, the Garage and Bonus Room were 
part of the dwelling.  
C. Liberty Is Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees or Costs. 
Liberty argues that they should be awarded attorneys' fees on thi s appeal. The 
McFarlands object on the following grounds: 
• For the reasons set fo rth herein , Liberty shou ld not prevail in thi s case, and therefore they 
will have no claim to attorneys' fees. 
• The McFarlands have not brought this appeal fri vo lously. Th is case has a firm basis in 




Based on the forego ing, and fo r the reasons set forth in the Appell ants' Brief, Mr. and 
Mrs. McFarland respectfully request that this Court reverse the District Court's decision granting 
summary judgment in favor of Liberty and find that the Policy limi ts applicable to the 
"Dwelling" apply to the Claim. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS _1}p_ j4;_ _ day of July 20 18. 
By --~-------
Ryan McFarland, ISB No. 7347 
Attorn ys fo r Plaintiffs 
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